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Abstract. The theoretical literature around effective tax systems, which are a precondition 
of an effective state and therefore of development, has coalesced around the idea of a 
‘fiscal social contract’, in which beneficial expenditures are delivered to taxpayers in return 
for their tax payments, rather than a coercive relationship existing between them and the 
government. However, these ideas about governance have with few exceptions not been 
incorporated into empirical analyses of tax yield and how to increase it.  In this paper, we 
attempt to fill this gap. 
Our starting-point is the model of the (fundamentally) democratic social contract proposed 
by Rousseau 250 years ago, which suggests that increased democracy will be good for many 
state-building functions including fiscal mobilisation. We develop this idea by means of a 
prisoner’s dilemma model, which shows that a ‘fiscal contract’ between taxpayers and the 
government (in the sense of a top left-hand corner, ‘win-win’ solution of the prisoner’s 
dilemma) will be most likely to emerge not only as a result of greater democratic 
accountability, but also if taxpayers feel that they are getting good value from, and are well 
informed about, government expenditures in exchange for their tax payments.  This model 
is then estimated empirically against a sample of 62 developing countries between 1980-
2008 (with the share of human capital expenditures in public expenditure used as an 
indicator of the value which taxpayers derive from that expenditure), backed by two case 
studies of Ghana and Zambia. Our results, both from econometric analysis and the case-
studies, suggest that  increasing levels of democratic accountability and the quality of public 
expenditure are correlated, and causally connected, with increasing tax/GDP ratios, and that 
in countries where competitiveness is blunted by high levels of rent-seeking, the tax ratio 
will be less buoyant.  Also, the process by which fiscal contracts are constructed is 
important. The government needs to send the taxpayer an effective signal, or bona-fide, 
illustrating the benefits to be derived from paying their tax bills. Illustrations of effective 
bona-fides are provided. 
Keywords: fiscal policy, tax ratios, fiscal contracts, bona-fides, democracy 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that development is impossible without the construction of an 
effective state, and that a crucial element in building an effective state is building an effective 
tax system (di John 2006, Brautigam et al. 2008, Besley and Persson 2013)2. But especially in 
the poorest countries, building an effective tax system is no straightforward or easy matter, 
because it is precisely the poorest countries that are also the most politically fragile (OECD 
2014:  figure 1.3 ) and hence it is in these countries that it is politically most risky and 
administratively most difficult to introduce new taxes, broaden the taxpayer base, raise tax 
rates or even get existing taxpayers to pay the taxes that are due3. Therefore, there is a 
tendency for the poorer countries to remain trapped with low and near-static levels of 
revenue to income whilst middle-income countries develop their tax ratios at a faster rate 
(Moore 1998, Mosley 2015)4 – and since state-building drives development, there is also a 
risk that the gap between the poorest and other countries may therefore widen. 
For several decades the development community has been aware of this problem, and 
has sought to analyse and tackle it. International development agencies, with the IMF in the 
lead, have sought to wean LDC governments away from dependence on their traditional 
source of revenue, taxes on international trade, which is low-yielding, distortionary and 
unstable (Greenaway and Milner 1991), and towards taxes on other bases, and in particular 
VAT, which has now been adopted by a majority of emergent and developing countries. Both 
independent researchers and, again, the IMF have also explored the effectiveness of these 
measures by means of regressions on the determinants of  tax yields: as shown in Table 1, 
these exercises began in the 1960s with analyses of macro-economic influences such as 
inflation, income and openness to foreign trade, but by the 1980s had broadened their scope 
to consider also the composition of the tax base5,and by the millennium indicators of 
governance quality had also entered the picture, including corruption, rule of law and, in one 
very recent case (Langford and Ohlenburg 2016), democratic accountability. The picture 
                                                          
2 Besley and Persson’s study of ‘pillars of prosperity’ argues that one of the pillars of an effective state is a well- 
functioning tax system, not least because the tax system underpins other institutions, public expenditure and 
legal institutions in particular. They argue that ‘Countries that have better fiscal capacity also trend to have 
better legal capacity. Both measures are also correlated with contemporaneous GDP per capita’ (Besley and 
Persson 2013: 7, see also pages 31-33, 40-102, 131-138.) The case for the primacy of taxation as a development 
instrument has also been made by Deborah Brautigam: ‘Taxation is an underrated tool in the effort to build 
more capable and responsive states…Democracies are built not only on periodic elections but also on a social 
contract based on bargaining over the collection and spending of public revenue. [Indeed we can argue] that 
taxation may play the central role in building and sustaining the power of states.’ (Brautigam 2008a; also  
Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008:1-2).    
3 For (mostly theoretical)  discussions of tax evasion and its determinants, see Rablen (2010) and Hashimzade et 
al (2012) 
4 In the sample examined by ourselves for the period 1990-2010(Mosley 2015, Table 1) nine out of twenty low-
income countries were able to raise their tax ratios over that period, achieving an end-of-period tax ratio of 
11.1%, whereas 35 out of 41 middle-income countries were able to raise their tax ratios, achieving an end-of-
period ratio of 19%. 
5 Especially the share of mining, which tends empirically to have a significant negative influence on tax revenue; 
this has been seen as one manifestation of the ‘natural resource curse’. 
3 
 
emerging from these regressions is not completely clear: in most cases, inflation and the share 
of mining in GDP have a negative impact on the tax ratio, but those are just about the only 
robust findings. Amongst the few studies which include governance indicators in their 
analyses6, the only consistent story is that corruption generally impacts negatively on the tax 
ratio, which is very nearly a tautology, because a large part of corruption consists of people 
and companies illegally failing to pay their taxes. 
Table 1 here 
For some while, analysts have been aware that the roots of poor revenue generation 
performance are, as noted above, political – governments especially of weak states are 
frightened to raise taxes if they fear that the consequences of doing so will be immediate loss 
of office or worse, influential (corporate and individual) taxpayers in such societies will seek 
to use any leverage they can muster to avoid paying tax, and all taxpayers will resent paying 
tax more particularly if they can see that others much richer than them are not doing so. This 
is well illustrated by the case of Bolivia in February 2003, when at a time of severe economic 
crisis, following an IMF recommendation, the government proposed to widen the income-tax 
net so as to include sections of the middle class not then liable to pay tax. This proposed tax 
increase had to be abandoned after a violent revolt, in which over thirty people were killed, 
including several members of the La Paz police (who were in the group newly included in the 
tax net under the IMF’s proposals, and were themselves seeking to throw the proposals out).  
A key factor underlying the insurrection was that it became widely known that most upper-
income people, especially oil and mining executives, who were due to pay income tax were 
not actually doing so, and this had been widely publicised in the press and on the internet7.  
In order to mitigate the anger and political turmoil caused by tax increases especially in fragile 
political environments, efforts have therefore been made by many governments to 
depoliticise the process of revenue collection by transferring tax collection from the direct 
control of the ministry of finance and other political authorities to autonomous revenue 
authorities (Bergman 2003, Chand and Moene 1999 , Fjeldstad  and Moore 2009); and also, 
more fundamentally, to frame the process of revenue collection as part of a fiscal ‘social 
contract’ (Moore 1998, 2013;  Brautigam et al. 2008) in which government commits itself to 
provide public services in exchange for the revenue provided by taxpayers, rather than as a 
coercive process in which the state extorts taxes where it can without needing to justify or be 
held to account for the way in which this is done. Such a reconceptualization of the 
government-taxpayer relationship has, especially in Africa and Latin America, often been seen 
as an important element in the transition of those countries towards greater democratic 
accountability, and in their transition towards higher tax ratios as reported above. But, for the 
moment, this is all supposition: we do not have any systematic evidence concerning the 
                                                          
6 Only seven of the thirty-one regression-based  studies listed in  Appendix 1 use any measure of governance 
(usually corruption)  as a covariate of tax yield, and only one (Langford and Ohlenburg 2016) examines the 
influence of democratic accountability on tax revenue. 
7 For further detail of this episode, see Mosley (2012), chapter 10, Lora (2013) and Laserna (2011). 
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processes by which the political barriers to higher tax ratios have been overcome, and, as we 
can see from table 1 and Appendix 1, the issue of how such fiscal contracts can be formed, 
and what impact they have had, has scarcely been tackled by the empirical literature on 
revenue generation (few regression studies include governance variable on the right-hand 
side, and those that do mostly consider only corruption indices). Our main purpose here is to 
begin to fill this gap, by constructing and testing a picture of the process by which social 
contracts emerge and impact on the capacity of fiscal systems in developing countries.  
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Table 1. Regression studies of drivers of tax ratios (selection) 
Investigator Dependent 
variable, 
sample and 
time period 
Estimation 
method 
Independent (right-hand side) variables in regression(*denotes significance of this 
variable at the 5% level or higher) 
Remarks 
Macro-economic Economic 
structure and  
Governance Other 
Williamson(1961) T/Y(33 LDCs 
1950-59) 
OLS Per capita GNP*     
Lotz and 
Morss(1970) 
T/Y(50 
developing 
countries, 
1962-66) 
OLS Per capita 
GDP(private)*, 
openness* ([X+M]/Y) 
 ‘Government 
centralisation’ (i.e. 
autocracy) 
  
Chelliah et al 
(1975) 
T/Y 
(all LDCs 
1972-76) 
OLS GDP, 
Openness 
(exports/GDP*) 
Mining 
exports/GDP* 
   
Tait, Grätz, 
Eichengreen 
(1979) 
T/Y 
(all LDCs 
1972-76) 
OLS GDP(net of exports), 
Openness 
(exports/GDP) 
Shares of 
agriculture and 
mining* in GDP 
 
   
Leuthold (1991) T/Y 
(eight African 
countries 
1973-81) 
OLS, also 
Autoregressive 
Desired tax share, , 
openness* ([X+M]/Y) 
 
 
Shares of 
mining and 
agriculture* in 
income 
  Optimising model: 
public decision maker 
maximises private 
disposable income and 
value of public goods 
and services 
Baunsgaard and 
Keen(2005) 
T/Y (111 
developed and 
less developed 
countries, 
1975-2000) 
Panel data 
(fixed and 
random 
effects); 
instrumental 
variables; GMM 
Per capita GDP, 
openness*[(X+M)/G
DP], 
Agriculture/GDP
; share of trade 
taxes and VAT in 
total revenue 
 Overseas aid*  
Gupta(2007) T/Y 
(1980-2004) 
Panel data with 
fixed- and 
Per capita GDP* Agriculture/ 
GDP* 
Corruption*, political 
stability, rule of law 
Aid/GDP*  
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random-effects 
specifications, 
also difference-
GMM and 
system-GMM 
(significant in  low 
income countries 
only) 
 
 
Openness (goods 
and services/GDP) 
 
Drummond et al 
(2012) 
Total 
revenue/GDP 
(including 
social 
contributions 
and non-tax 
revenue) 
(1980-2009) 
Panel data with 
fixed- and 
random-effects 
specifications 
GDP/capita* 
Agriculture/GDP 
Inflation rate* 
Share of trade 
taxes 
Corruption, oil/natural 
resource rents*, size of 
shadow economy 
Aid/GDP  
Fenocchietto and 
Pessino(2013) 
Tax effort 
(using 
stochastic 
frontier 
method) 
Panel data with 
fixed- and 
random-effects 
specifications 
 
Inflation, 
agriculture/GDP*, 
educational level 
(secondary 
enrolment rate?), 
Openness (goods 
and services/GDP)* 
 
 Corruption* Gini coefficient 
of inequality* 
Uses stochastic-
frontier analysis to 
incorporate optimality 
considerations 
Langford and 
Ohlenburg(2016) 
T/Y 
(excluding 
natural 
resource 
revenue and 
social security 
contributions) 
 GDP/capita, 
inflation* 
educational level 
(secondary 
enrolment rate?), 
educational level, 
openness 
(imports/GDP) 
Industrial 
structure 
(manufacturing/
output) 
Corruption*, law and 
order*, democratic 
accountability 
 Uses stochastic-
frontier analysis to 
incorporate optimality 
considerations 
Sources: as listed in left-hand column and in bibliography.  Notes:* against a coefficient denotes significance of the relevant variable in the model indicated 
at least the 5% level.  A fuller review of tax revenue regressions is provided in Appendix 1. 
7 
 
 By what process can effective governance, and in particular the construction of  fiscal 
‘social contracts’ between taxpayers and governments,  impact on the growth of tax revenue? 
We propose, as an initial hypothesis, that three main processes are relevant: the evolution 
and maintenance of liberty, equality and fraternity in relation to fiscal policy, or more 
precisely the subjection of governments to democratic accountability, the development of 
social equity within communities and the development of intra-community trust between 
taxpayers and governments. All of these, of course, are contested concepts, which we need 
to explore. 
 The idea that effective social contracts must be democratic originated with the 
Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762, 1986), who argued that only the 
people, and not autocratic authorities, should be allowed to legislate: ‘might does not make 
right, and…we are obliged to obey none but legitimate powers’ (Rousseau 1986: 7). 
Dictatorship, therefore, was in his view no way of achieving a social contract; however, the 
delegation of decision-making powers to citizens, in Rousseau’s view, would only take make 
possible the expression of private interests, and not of the social optimum, or ‘general will’ 
as Rousseau called it, which ‘looks only to the common interest, whereas (the will of all) looks 
to private interest, and is simply a sum of particular wills’ (Rousseau 1986:29)8. For Rousseau, 
what was required to achieve the social optimum was, in the first instance, a very strict form 
of democracy, not typical of any modern state, in which, in the first instance all legislative 
decisions were decided by the majority view of all adult citizens, as in Rousseau’s native city-
state of Geneva  (Rousseau 1986:  71-73, Rosenblatt 1997), modified by the actions of an 
enlightened executive, or president, who would act in the interests of the general will, but 
‘was supposed to refrain entirely from the use of coercive power’ (Rousseau 1986, editor’s 
introduction by Frederick Watkins, page xxxvii)9. Rousseau’s view was put forward as a riposte 
to the view put forward by Thomas Hobbes, who had argued a century earlier that the 
preservation of social order required the imposition of a social contract enforced through the 
autocratic power of a sovereign (Hobbes 1651, Cervellati et al 2008), but it will be clear from 
the above that his approach finesses the problem of how to create representative political 
institutions, not to mention accountable bureaucracies and effective judicial institutions, and 
cannot be exactly represented by democratic accountability in the sense of one adult, one 
vote.   
                                                          
8 This distinction between the general will and the will of all can be interpreted as awareness of public-goods 
problems – in other words, the existence of particular services, including political stability and environmental 
protection, which are in the public interest even though they are not perceived by citizens to be in their private 
interest. 
9 This is the way Rousseau put the point: 
‘In order… that the social compact may not be a meaningless formality, it includes the tacit agreement, which 
alone can give force to the rest, that anyone who refuses to obey the general will shall be forced to do so by the 
whole body; which means nothing more or less than that he be forced to be free. For this is the condition which, 
by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees him against any form of personal dependence; it is the secret 
and the driving force of the political mechanism; and it alone gives legitimacy to civil obligations, which 
otherwise would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the gravest abuses.’ (Rousseau 1762/1986: 19).   
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One element in the achievement of social order and development, as discussed 
earlier, in which the conflict between general will/social optimum and private optimum 
emerges particularly sharply, is of course the provision of public goods financed by taxation. 
Taxation, of course, can only be imposed by legislative authority, and it therefore seems to 
follow axiomatically that ability to impose taxes varies with the degree of democratic 
accountability, but subject to the caveat made above concerning the distinction between the 
will of all individuals and the social optimum; because private individuals, considered purely 
as taxpayers, dislike paying tax, and can only be expected to be willing to do so if either they 
see themselves getting something in return (such as benefits from public expenditure) or an 
‘enlightened executive, or president’ persuades them that it is worth entering into a social 
contract which provides such benefits in return for tax payments. An initial piece of evidence 
in supporting the idea that democratic governance may be good for the formation of social 
contracts is provided by two-variable regressions such as that depicted in Figure 1, for a 
sample of developing countries between 1990-2010, which suggest a significantly positive 
relationship between increases in democratic accountability and the tax-to-GDP ratio. 
Figure 1 here 
  In addition, the recent literature on the emergence and effectiveness of ‘fiscal 
contracts’ suggests that, although there is clearly two-way causation at work, the sequence 
of causation may be evolving: according to Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, historically ‘taxation 
contributed to political development and democratisation by catalysing “revenue 
bargaining”, i.e. a process in which the state exchanged influence over public policy with tax 
revenues from citizens’ but more recently in LDCs, and specifically in Tanzania and Uganda, 
‘democratisation drives tax reform – not the other way round’ (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, in 
Brautigam et al (eds) (2008), pp. 128-129); in this context, see also Baskavan (2014). 
Our second proposition is that the likelihood of forming of a satisfactory and stable 
social contract between taxpayers and government depends on the establishment of mutual 
trust, or social capital, between those parties – an expectation by the government that taxes 
will be paid, in return for an expectation by taxpayers that the government will be 
trustworthy, i.e. that they in return will receive public services that will benefit them. In other 
words, to understand the amount of tax which is paid (the tax ratio), we have to consider 
factors influencing not just the size and incidence of the tax bill, but the amount and quality 
of public services which are provided in return, as essential elements in the fiscal social 
contract.  Jeffrey Timmons goes further than this, insisting that ‘The contemporary practice 
of studying spending and taxation in isolation from one another is fundamentally flawed 
because half of the equation (either taxes or spending) is left out of the analysis’ (Timmons 
2005:531). 
 Developing this idea, Timmons explains the growth of trust between governments and 
taxpayers in terms of a game between these two groups, and we build on his approach here. 
His model, which we present in adapted form as Table 2, is a 2x2 matrix, with both parties 
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having two options: the truster, or taxpayer, may either comply or not with demands to pay 
tax presented by the government, and the trustee, or government, may either offer public 
services in exchange for the tax revenue provided, or simply extort this revenue from the 
taxpayer, using threats or sanctions if necessary, without offering anything in return. 
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Figure 1: Sample of 62 less developed countries: scatterplot, tax/GDP ratio in relation to democratic accountability 
                
Source: democratic accountability data from University of Gothenburg Quality of Government database (www. qog. pol. su.se); tax/GDP ratio from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators database. (Not all data points shown in the scatterplot). 
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Table 2. The generic ‘taxpayer’s dilemma’                                                                     
 Options for government (‘trustee’) 
Implement  
delivery of services 
and ‘trade’ this for 
payments of taxes  
Coerce the taxpayer 
without offering any 
benefits in return 
 
Options for taxpayer 
(‘truster’) 
Pay tax (‘Comply’) Quadrant I 
αG*-βT, T-Gc 
Quadrant II 
-βT, T 
Not pay tax (‘Not comply’) Quadrant III 
G*,-Gc 
Quadrant IV 
p(-T-S), p(T+S)-Sc 
Entries in cells are presented in the order: (taxpayer, government). 
Source:  adapted from Timmons(2005), figure 1, p.535. Meanings of symbols are presented both in the text 
and also in Table 4 below. 
 
[G*= government expenditure, α = ‘quality of government expenditure’, T= tax revenue, β = 
disutility attached to tax payments, S=penalty paid by non-taxpayers who are ‘caught’, p= 
probability of being caught] 
 
 In Table 2, we imagine that the state is bargaining with the taxpaying population for 
revenue. T is the total amount of public revenue (including revenue from nontax sources such 
as user charges), and β is the utility(characteristically negative)  attached by taxpayers to 
paying them; G* is the amount of government expenditure (and α is taxpayers’ estimated 
valuation of those benefits); Gc  is the cost of producing the goods and services financed by 
public expenditure; p is the probability that the state is able to identify and bill those who are 
liable to pay tax; S is the amount of the penalty imposed on defaulting taxpayers; and Sc is the 
cost of imposing that penalty. As Timmons (2005:537) notes, if the payoffs satisfy the 
conditions αG*-T>p(-T-S)> -T for taxpayers and T-Gc>p(T+S) –Sc > Gc for the state, the game 
is a prisoner’s dilemma. Of course, in the conventional (one-shot) prisoner’s dilemma, the 
equilibrium solution is in the bottom right-hand corner (quadrant IV) – in other words, no 
agreement or contract is reached and as a consequence, both parties are worse off than they 
would have been in the situation where they would have been able to communicate and 
bargain. In Table 2, where we set the values of the parameters at the level G*=4, T=2,Gc= α= 
1, β= -1, S = -2,Sc = 0,p=0.5,  the outcome of the taxpayer’s dilemma is of this sort: the 
taxpayer’s dominant strategy is always to play Not Comply rather than comply (since 4>2 and 
0>-2)  ; the government’s dominant strategy is always to play Coerce rather than trade 
services for compliance (since 2>1 and 0>-1); hence no fiscal contract materialises.  
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Table 3a. The ‘taxpayer’s dilemma’: the pre-fiscal contract situation                                                                                          
 Options for government (‘trustee’) 
Implement  delivery 
of services and ‘trade’ 
this for payments of 
taxes  
Coerce the 
taxpayer without 
offering any 
benefits in return 
 
Options for taxpayer 
(‘truster’) 
Pay tax (‘Comply’) Quadrant I 
2,1 
Quadrant II 
-2,2 
Not pay tax (‘Not comply’) Quadrant III 
4,-1 
Quadrant IV 
0,0 
 Entries in cells are presented in the order (taxpayer, government) 
 Note: the shaded area denotes the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome. 
 
However, if we imagine a reform in the tax base, for example, that it evolves  from 
being principally based on trade taxes to being increasingly based on income and 
consumption taxes, such as occurred in many developing countries in the 1990s and 2000s 
under the impetus of economic crisis and IMF adjustment loan packages, then that can be 
expected, especially if accompanied by evidence of increasing social expenditure and less 
misuse of tax revenue, to lead to sustainably higher tax ratios and higher and better-quality 
public expenditure, and these can bring about a shift to the top left-hand (fiscal contract) 
equilibrium. If for example, we imagine that following reforms of the type described,  G* 
increases from 4 to 6, the sanction attached to non-payment of tax (S) increases from 0 to 2, 
and the utilities attached by taxpayers to government expenditure (α) and payment of tax (β) 
move to 2 and -0.5 respectively, then the payoffs are as indicated in Table 3b, and the 
dominant strategy equilibrium moves towards a ‘fiscal contract’ in the top left-hand corner.  
 
Table 3b. The solution to the ‘taxpayer’s dilemma’?: a possible post-fiscal contract 
equilibrium. 
  Options for government (‘trustee’) 
  Quadrant I 
Implement  
delivery of 
services and 
‘trade’ this for 
payments of 
taxes  
Quadrant II 
Coerce the 
taxpayer without 
offering any 
benefits in return 
Truster (taxpayer) 
Options 
Pay tax (‘comply’) Quadrant I 
10,3 
Quadrant II 
-1, 2 
Not pay tax (‘not comply’) Quadrant III 
6, -1 
Quadrant IV 
-4, -2 
 Entries in cells are presented in the order (taxpayer, government) 
Note: the shaded area denotes the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome (which may be 
interpreted as a form of fiscal contract). 
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For the taxpayer, compliance is now better than non-compliance whatever riposte the 
state makes (since 10>6 and -1 > -4) and for the state, it is now better to improve service 
delivery and ‘trade’ that for higher tax payments than to coerce (since 3>-2 and -1 <-2). Thus  
better service delivery, in association with changes in tax structures and democratisation, has 
played a key part, in this model, in incentivising trust between taxpayers and governments 
(Lenton and Mosley, 2011): that is, in bringing about patterns of behaviour (which we can 
style as fiscal contracts, even though they are most often unspoken and implicit, rather than 
explicit) which then make possible sustained improvements in tax ratios, in defiance of the 
short-term political risks associated with raising taxes especially in fragile states. Empirical 
evidence has gradually built up, initially for the United States (Scholz and Pinney 1995, Scholz 
and Lubell 1998) and more recently at micro-level for parts of Africa ( Bodea and Le Bas 2013, 
Ali et al 2014) which suggests that taxpayers are more willing to pay taxes if they evaluate 
related public services as being satisfactory. Of course, ‘satisfactory’ is a subjective and often 
ambiguous term. Two of the meanings which have been attached to it relate to improved 
quality of outcomes (as in the case of reforms in public health services which reduce mortality 
rates, or educational reforms which increase pass rates in examinations) and improved 
breadth of coverage (as in the case of services which used to be made available to privileged 
social groups only and are now much more widely available), and we shall make use of the 
second of these meanings in our modelling below.  In recent years, a number of developing-
country governments, initially in Latin America but now spreading to Africa, have sought to 
capitalise on the second of these meanings by proposing ‘fiscal contracts’ which are explicit 
rather than implicit: e.g. tax increases which are earmarked to specific increases in 
expenditure which are expected to yield political benefits, often targeted on lower income 
groups10. Explicit fiscal contracts of this sort we refer to as linked taxation, and we discuss 
them further below. 
 In achieving this transition from deadlock without trust to a fiscal contract with mutual 
trust, the sequence of moves is once again important. In particular, in the game portrayed 
above, it is the government, which is relatively powerful and unlike taxpayers directly controls 
the instruments of fiscal management, which needs to make the opening move, by portraying 
itself through its actions as trustworthy: thus the taxpayer’s dilemma is a dilemma for 
government also.  In the example portrayed above, this opening move is executed through 
actions on the expenditure side, i.e. the delivery of better public services. However, it can also 
                                                          
10 In a number of Latin American countries legislators have shown an increasing tendency to promise that new 
taxes will be committed to particular forms of social expenditure, often as a way of softening the blow. Often 
these commitments are purely informal, as in the case of Brazil and Chile (Barrientos 2013:192-193), but in three 
cases, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the commitment is contractual (Mosley and Abdul-Gafaru 2016). In the 
case of Bolivia, there is evidence that two of the main social welfare payments which are earmarked to be paid 
out of specific tax revenues – the Renta Dignidad, or universal old-age pension, , and the Bono Juancito Pinto, 
an educational subsidy for lower income children, both of which are mainly financed out of taxes on oil and gas 
production, there is evidence that these  specific tax-linked social benefits have impacted heavily and favourably 
on both headcount poverty and the popularity of the government (Arauco 2014).  More recently, this kind of 
earmarking of tax revenues has spread to Africa, and in section 4 below we examine attempts to construct fiscal 
contracts of this kind in Ghana and Zambia. 
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be done by reforms on the tax side, which show that the burden of taxation is being borne 
more by richer than by poor people. An example of this is provided by Ghana and Uganda, 
both of which in the early 1990s reduced (in the case of Uganda completely removed) implicit 
taxes on exports of, respectively, cocoa and coffee, which fell heavily on low-income 
producers of crops and their employees11. These low-income taxpayers thus received 
evidence of government’s commitment to a fairer distribution of the tax burden which proved 
an important bargaining tool in building their trust and laying the basis for future extensions 
of the tax base and increases in the tax ratio12. Other first moves are possible, including 
amending the structure of taxation away from consumption taxes and towards income taxes, 
which may be expected to make the distribution of income more progressive (di John 2006) 
and  as we have seen in the Bolivian case above, closing tax loopholes, notably exemptions 
from corporate income tax enjoyed by multinational corporations. 
                 In all of these cases, it has been argued that inequality of income and assets, 
especially if that can be seen as having been aggravated by tax and expenditure reforms, 
increases the difficulties associated with building trust between government and taxpayers 
and moving from a ‘deadlock’ (bottom left-hand corner) equilibrium, as in Table 3a, to a social 
contract with consensus over a higher tax ratio, as in Table 3b. The paper by Cervellati et el. 
(2008), which models the transition from a Hobbes-type coercive social contract to a 
Rousseau-type democratic social contract, formally shows that under certain conditions, as 
the level of inequality increases, democratisation is delayed, the absence of good institutions 
is prolonged and the likelihood of people freely entering into a social contract with 
government diminishes13. Income inequality, therefore, may be proposed as a third influence 
on the formation of fiscal contracts, alongside quality of public expenditure and democratic 
accountability, needing to be put to the test.    
                                                          
11 In both cases, these implicit taxes arose from a government policy, imposed from the 1930s onward, of paying 
producers a fixed on- farm price for their deliveries of export crops, which was always less than the realised 
export price and in some years was as little as 10% of the export realisation. This policy and its reform are 
discussed further in section 4 below. 
12 It must be emphasised that especially in Ghana, the transition from a low-tax coercive equilibrium to a high-
tax contractual equilibrium was not smooth. Shortly after the cuts in export taxation described, the Ghana 
government tried to raise VAT too fast, to 17.5% in 1995, and without sufficient explanation, and there were 
riots in 1995 in which several people were killed. However, the government learned from this and has extended 
the practice of linking tax increases to particular classes of expenditure, (as with the ‘talk tax’ of 2004 which was 
earmarked for measures to reduce unemployment, and the National Health Insurance levy of 2008). Prichard 
(2009:8) has described Ghana as having achieved ‘the most dramatic and prolonged improvement in tax 
collection of any country in sub-saharan Africa (Prichard 2009:8 ) 
13 ‘(Our model shows that) a social contract can only emerge under a democratic regime if inequality is 
sufficiently small.’ Cervellati et al.(2008): 1378. But, they emphasise, oligarchic regimes can be efficient in 
equilibrium since concentrating power in the hands of a rich ruling elite may represent the only available option 
to avoid wasteful social conflict’ (ibid.: 1355).  The second of these findings recalls Rousseau’s appeal for an 
enlightened oligarch who would act in the interests of the general will, but would avoid the use of coercive 
power. The words ‘social contract’ (rather than ‘fiscal contract’) in the above should be noted; the authors are 
concerned with the formation of contractual relationships encompassing the state as a whole, rather than simply 
the fiscal policy variables with which we are concerned. 
15 
 
2. Empirical strategy  
 Our argument so far has been that improvements in democratic accountability, in the 
ability of governments to deliver services to taxpayers (G*, in the prisoner’s dilemma model 
above) and in the equity of distribution of income and assets are likely to facilitate the 
establishment of a stable ‘fiscal contract’ in which the tax base is broadened and, thereby the 
tax ratio is raised in a way that makes the provision of developmental services possible. Thus, 
the core of our explanatory story is: 
Figure 2a: The core model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This is our starting point, which defines the variables whose influence on tax ratios we need 
to explore. However, to convert this basic story into a formulation which will give us a picture 
of how governance impacts on tax ratios, we need to bring into the story, as controls, those 
influences  which have long been recognised as impacting on tax yields, such as the 
composition of taxation and the state of the macro-economy. We also need to acknowledge 
the simultaneities in the system, notably the fact that all of the main independent variables 
in figure 2a – democratic accountability, income distribution and quality of service delivery – 
are determined by fiscal and other policies, which in less developed countries the IMF and 
other international financial institutions including aid agencies will at least attempt to 
influence. Relatedly, some of the main variables in the system are endogenous: in particular, 
the justification for seeking to improve tax performance is that it will improve the 
developmental performance of public expenditure, which will in turn influence the growth 
rate, which will impact back on, in particular, the behaviour of the international financial 
institutions and their aid flows (and reform recommendations) to developing countries. If we 
feed these ideas into the core model, we derive the expanded model depicted as Figure 2b: 
Democratic 
accountability 
Quality of service 
delivery 
Income/asset 
distribution 
Emergence (or not) of a fiscal contract 
(Tables 3a and 3b) 
Dependent variable (T/Y) 
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Figure 2b: The extended model, incorporating simultaneities and control variables. 
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Note: the blue-shaded boxes represent the ‘core model’ of figure 2a. 
Economic reform Change in tax 
structures 
IMF/WB loans (and other influences on 
reform) 
Democratic 
accountability 
Quality of 
service delivery 
Income/asset 
distribution 
Emergence (or not) of a fiscal 
contract (tables 3a and 3b) 
Dependent variable (T/Y) 
Public expenditure level 
Macro-economic performance indicators 
(including growth rate, income level, poverty 
rate) 
Investment rate 
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The core model (figure 2a) may be represented as a single equation, which will be estimated 
by OLS: 
T/Y = a1DA + a2IPE + a3GINI + a4(Ta/T) + a5(inflation rate)     (1) 
where: 
T = total government revenue, including elements of revenue not typically classified 
as taxes such as user charges, tolls, school fees levied by government, etc.; 
Ta =value of tax revenue derived from duties imposed on agricultural exports and 
imports: 
Y= GDP at constant 2000 prices; 
Inflation rate = percentage rate of change of retail prices; 
DA=democratic accountability measure. This is the measure of institutionalised 
accountability (p_democ) produced by the Polity index (Teorell et al. 2009:54) and is derived 
as an aggregate of Polity’s measures of competitiveness of political participation, openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the president or chief 
governmental executive. Note that data on civil liberties are not included in this measure. 
IPE = indicator of effectiveness or impact of public expenditure. As an indicator of the 
effectiveness of public expenditure, we use the share of public expenditure spent on human 
capital (health and education), which we interpret as a measure of the productivity of the 
social wage, following the approach taken in Mosley(2015). This indicator is derived from the 
approach of new growth theory, in which expenditures which create new knowledge, notably 
health and education, make an additional contribution to growth (Romer 1986, Levine and 
Renelt 1992 , Hendry and Krolzig 2004) because they impact both on GDP and on the growth 
of productivity, and thus exhibit increasing returns. For this reason, as noted above, many 
social protection schemes throughout the developing world have been made conditional on 
‘increased effectiveness of spending’ in precisely this sense (Barrientos 2013, etc).  
GINI = Gini coefficient of inequality; 
               The extended model (figure 2b) may be represented as a simultaneous five-equation 
model, to be estimated by instrumental-variables methods (3SLS in Tables 5 and 6 below) to 
take note of the simultaneities in the system. 
  The first equation is simply the core model: 
T/Y = a1DA + a2IPE + a3GINI + a4(Ta/T) + a5(inflation rate)                                                   (1) 
              The second equation estimates the impact of tax effort on public expenditure: 
G*/Y = a6(T/Y) + controls                                                                                                            (2) 
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 where G* = total government expenditure; 
 The third equation estimates the effort of public expenditure on the ratio of 
investment to income, I/Y: 
I/Y = a7(I/Y) + controls                                                                                                                (3) 
              The fourth equation estimates the impact of investment and other standard ‘new 
growth theory’ variables (including educational enrolment rates, PENROL and SENROL, and 
base-year income GNIPK1988 ), the real exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness, and 
aid flows) on growth: 
GDPG = a8(I/Y) + a9(PENROL and/or SENROL) + a10(GNIPK1980) 
 +a11RER +a12(A/Y)                                                                                                                       (4) 
 Where PENROL = primary school enrolment rate, 
              SENROL  = secondary school enrolment rate, 
              GNIPK1980 = per capita national income at 1980 prices, 
                           RER = real exchange rate, 
                           A/Y = aid disbursements as a proportion of GNP; 
A/Y= a12(GNIPK1980) + a13(POP)                                                                                               (5) 
             where POP is population size, and both it and  base-year income, GNIPK1980 
are of course exogenous with respect to growth of income. 
 
Table 4. Notation 
Symbol Meaning Source (if included in 
empirical estimation) 
T Total public revenue (including 
revenue from nontax sources such 
as user charges) 
IMF, International Finance 
Statistics 
Ta Value of public revenue derived 
from taxes on exports or imports of 
agricultural commodities 
IMF, Government 
Expenditure Statistics 
Yearbook 
Β Disutility attached to payment of 
tax by taxpayers 
 
G* Total government expenditure IMF, Government 
Expenditure Statistics 
Yearbook 
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Gc  Cost of goods and services financed 
by public expenditure 
 
IPE Effectiveness (impact) of public 
expenditure’ (here defined as share 
of health and education 
expenditures in total expenditure) 
IMF, Government 
Expenditure Statistics 
GINI Gini coefficient of inequality World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Α Taxpayers’ valuation of benefits 
from government expenditure 
 
S Penalty (e.g. fine) imposed on 
defaulting taxpayers 
 
Sc Cost (to exchequer) of penalty 
imposed on defaulting taxpayers 
 
I Gross investment expenditure World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Y GNP at constant 2000 prices World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
GNIPK1980 GNP per capita in 1980 World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
DA Democratic accountability: 
indicator of extent of democratic 
decision-making within government 
World Bank/University of 
Gothenburg Quality of 
Government database 
(www.qog.gu.se) 
INFL Inflation rate World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
RER Real exchange rate World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
PENROL Primary school enrolment rate World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
SENROL Secondary school enrolment rate World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
POP Population World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
 
 
3. Results: quantitative 
          We analyse the two models described above by regression methods:  the model of 
figure 2a (equation (1)) as a single equation by ordinary least squares and the model of figure 
2b (equations (1) through (5)) as a simultaneous system by instrumental variables (3SLS) 
methods against a sample of 62 less developed countries between 1980 and 2008. The results 
are presented in Table 5. From both the OLS and the 3SLS analysis, the trust, or effectiveness 
of public expenditure variable (IPE) and the democratic accountability variable (demacc), but 
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not the Gini coefficient of inequality or either of our controls, inflation and the ratio of 
agricultural taxes to GDP14, emerge as significant correlates of the tax ratio. In the 
instrumental- variables analysis, public expenditure, and thence investment, are significantly 
correlated with the tax ratio, and this then has a significant influence on investment and 
growth, suggesting support for the idea of the tax ratio as a driver of growth indicated above. 
The Sargan-tests suggest that none of the five equations in the instrumental-variables analysis 
suffers from over-identification biases. Therefore, although the Gini coefficient of inequality 
has often been treated as a likely influence on tax ratios and indeed has been reported as a 
significant influence in several regressions,15 it plays no further part in our analysis. 
                  It will be useful to explore whether the results presented in Table 5 can be seen as 
a chain of causation, as in Figure 3b, in which the formation of a ‘fiscal contract’ makes 
possible the building of a fiscal foundation in defiance of the political risks associated with a 
higher tax ratio. Therefore, in equation (1) of Table 6, we lag by one year the offer of improved 
services by government (modelled here as the share of health and education in total 
government spending, IPE) on the response of a higher tax ratio - the process which unlocked 
the door to a fiscal contract, or ‘top left-hand corner equilibrium’ in the prisoner’s dilemma 
model of table 3b above. We also allow, as is realistic, a lag between the paying in of higher 
tax payments and increases in total government expenditure.  With this change, the goodness 
of fit (r2 and t-statistic) of equations 1 and 2 in the 3SLS estimations improve further (as shown 
by table 6). This suggests that the correlations between governance variables, tax ratios, 
expenditure ratios and the macro-economy hypothesised in Table 5 do indeed indicate the 
presence of causal processes underlying the formation of fiscal contracts and their 
consequences.  However, the assumption of one-period lags made in Table 5 is somewhat 
arbitrary, and we discuss the underlying processes of causation in more detail in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Possible drivers of the tax ratio: regressions 
                                                          
14 This unexpected negative measured impact of agricultural taxation reflects(we believe) the 
conflicting pull of two influences: (1) in the long run (too long a run to be captured by these 
regressions) a shift from trade taxation to sales and income taxation enables a shift to more buoyant 
tax bases, but (2) it takes time to replace old and saturated tax bases with buoyant new ones, so that 
in the short run, ‘the replacement of trade taxes by VAT has resulted in significant losses of revenue 
for the governments of the poorest countries’ (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008:239, drawing on Baunsgaard 
and Keen 2005) 
15 For example, Bird et al (2004) (reference 19 in the Appendix), Cyan et al(2013) (reference 28) and 
Fenocchietto and Pessino(2013) all report a significant impact of the Gini coefficient of  inequality in 
their regressions. 
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Estimation  Method OLS 3SLS 
               Equation     
 
               Dependent  
               variable 
Regression  
Coefficients on 
independent variables: 
(1) 
 
Tax 
ratio(T/Y) 
(1) 
 
Tax 
ratio(T/Y) 
(2) 
 
Public 
expenditure 
(G*) 
(3) 
 
Total 
investment 
as 
percentage 
of GDP(I/Y) 
(4) 
 
GDP 
growth(G
DPG) 
(5) 
 
Aid/GDP 
(A/Y) 
Constant 5.51*** 
(3.38) 
6.84*** 
(5.30) 
2.07* 
(1.66) 
17.26*** 
(13.67) 
-2.02 
(1.44) 
41.64*** 
(10.78) 
Democratic 
accountability(DEMACC) 
0.47** 
(2.04) 
0.36* 
(1.79) 
    
Effectiveness of public 
spending/share of health 
and education in total 
government 
spending(IPE) 
0.75*** 
(7.66) 
0.73*** 
(9.51) 
    
Gini coefficient of income 
inequality(GINI) 
0.03 
(1.15) 
0.005 
(0.24) 
    
Tax ratio(T/Y)   1.35*** 
(15.36) 
   
Share of commodity taxes 
in total tax revenue(Ta/T) 
0.017 
(0.59) 
     
Public expenditure (G*)    0.15*** 
(2.61) 
  
Inflation rate(INFL) 0.0007 
(0.12) 
0.0002 
(0.45) 
  -0.001** 
(2.18) 
 
Total investment(I/Y)     0.37*** 
(5.02) 
 
Trade openness score     -0.02*** 
(2.78) 
 
GNP per capita in 
1988(GNIPK1988) 
    -0.0004 
(1.08) 
-0.005 
(1.39) 
Aid/GNP     0.011 
(0.35) 
 
Population      -0.047*** 
(5.94) 
‘r2’ 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.04 0.24 0.09 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan overid test: 
 Score (chi-square) 
            (p-value) 
  
 
2.1669 
0.1410 
 
 
2.4334 
0.1188 
 
 
3.4178 
0.0645 
 
 
3.1618 
0.0754 
 
 
0.1253 
0.7233 
Number of observations 257 288 288 288 288 288 
Sample: Data for the years 1984-2008 for 62 countries (listed in Appendix 2). Sources: principally from 
IMF Government Expenditure Statistics and World Bank World Development Indicators for 1980-2008; for 
further detail see Table 4 above.  ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 6 Tax ratio regressions (3SLS), embodying lags between expenditure quality, tax 
ratios and expenditure ratios. 
Estimation  Method 3SLS 
               Equation     
 
               Dependent  
               variable 
Regression  
coefficients 
on independent 
variables: 
(1) 
 
Tax 
ratio(T/Y) 
(2) 
 
Public 
expenditure 
(G*) 
(3) 
 
Total 
investment as 
percentage of 
GDP(I/Y) 
(4) 
 
GDP 
growth 
(5) 
 
Aid/GDP 
Constant 5.41*** 
(3.96) 
6.31*** 
(7.48) 
19.34*** 
(17.29) 
-2.32* 
(1.63) 
42.18*** 
(11.54) 
Democratic 
accountability(demacc) 
0.51** 
(2.40) 
    
Effectiveness of public 
spending(ipe) 
lagged one period 
0.73*** 
(9.26) 
    
Gini coefficient of 
income 
inequality(Gini) 
0.025 
(0.96) 
    
Tax ratio(T/Y) 
lagged one period 
 1.02*** 
(18.17) 
   
Share of trade taxes in 
total tax revenue 
     
Public expenditure 
(G*) 
  0.055 
(1.06) 
  
Inflation rate(INFL) 0.007 
(0.79) 
  -0.012* 
(1.72) 
 
Total investment(I/Y)    0.39*** 
(5.39) 
 
Trade openness score    -0.025*** 
(3.02) 
 
GNP per capita in 1988    -0.0003 
(0.82) 
-0.005* 
(1.72) 
Aid/GNP    0.014 
(0.46) 
 
Population     -0.045*** 
(6.28) 
‘r2’ 0.29 0.49 0.04 0.23 0.11 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.2870 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan 
overidentification test: 
 Score (chi-square) 
            (p-value) 
 
 
0.0004 
0.9830 
 
 
1.0185 
0.3129 
 
 
0.8471 
0.3574 
 
 
3.1618 
0.0754 
 
 
0.1253 
0.7233 
Number of 
observations 
275 275 275 275 275 
Sources: principally from IMF Government Expenditure Statistics and World Bank World Development Indicators for 1980-
2008; for further detail see Table 4 above. Notes:***/**/*  indicates statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
23 
 
4. Results: qualitative. A case study of Ghana and Zambia 
                     We can better understand the causal processes underlying the development of 
tax capacity by examining two country cases. Ghana and Zambia both fall in the middle of the 
income range covered by our sample countries, with per capita incomes between $1200 and 
$1800 during the 2000s; both are mineral-exporting economies; and in terms of 
democratisation, one of the key drivers of tax ratios according to our analysis, both have 
experienced a similar progression, with Ghana’s military-authoritarian regime of the 1970s 
and Zambia’s dominant-party government of the 1990s having given way to multi-party 
democracy. Both countries, moreover, introduced independent revenue authorities early in 
the reform process which followed the global crisis of the 1980s (Ghana in 1983 and Zambia 
in 1991). However, the evolution of the two countries’ tax performance has been very 
different, as shown by the two contrasted parts of  Figure 3: Ghana’s tax ratio, between 1980 
and 2014, rose from just under 5% to 20%, a process which Prichard described as ‘the most 
dramatic, and prolonged, improvement of any country in Africa’ (Prichard 2009:8), whereas 
Zambia’s, in spite of the favourable political environment, fell during the same period from 
22% to 17%, and appears, it will be recalled, as a ‘negative outlier’ on Figure 1 which plots the 
relationship between democratic accountability and fiscal performance: tax effort here has 
deteriorated in spite of liberalisation, the spread of democratic practice, and the 
establishment of an independent tax authority. Why this difference? 
Figure 3(a) Ghana: Chronology of tax ratio changes 
 
Source: IMF, Government Expenditure Statistics Yearbooks. 
Notes:  Entries in italics (bold) represent tax changes (changes in the regulatory regime). 
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Figure 3(b) Zambia: chronology of tax ratio changes 
 
Source: Masiye (2016) 
Notes: *NERP= National Economic Recovery Programme. 
              Entries in italic (bold) represent tax changes (changes in the regulatory regime). 
 
                    We suggest that the divergence is largely due to two factors of great importance 
to the two countries’ political economies: Ghana, unlike Zambia, had a politically potent 
smallholder export sector and Ghana, unlike Zambia, achieved a close working relationship 
with the IMF and other key aid donors. These differences, we shall argue, fed directly into the 
evolution of the fiscal contracts which emerged in the two countries. 
 Ghana’s exports of cocoa, and to a lesser extent other tropical export crops such as 
pineapple, have since early colonial times been the mainstay of the economy alongside gold 
and other minerals, by contrast with Zambia which since the 1920s has been wholly mineral-
dependent. From 1930 until 1992, however, lacking a political leverage corresponding to their 
economic contribution16, Ghanaian cocoa producers were subjected to an implicit tax, at a 
rate varying between 30% and 90%, consisting of the difference between the export price of 
                                                          
16 There is one exception to this tendency: between 1969 and 1972 Kofi Busia’s National Liberation Congress, 
whose elite was dominated by representatives from Ashanti, the main cocoa-growing area, did win power and 
attempt to roll back the implicit cocoa export tax: but they were forced out of power by a military coup before 
they were able to make any progress with repealing export taxes. 
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cocoa and the price paid to cocoa farmers17. This ‘cocoa industry development fund’, as it was 
formally known, thus became a key element in Ghana’s public revenue, which has no parallel 
in Zambia, where public revenue  is and has always been composed less of commodity taxes 
and much more of  taxes on sales and personal income18. 
 Both economies were hit hard by the global depression of the 1980s, and by the 
consequent collapse of commodity prices and foreign investment. Ghana, however, was 
much the quicker of the two administrations to acknowledge its dependence on, and form 
working relationships (ESAFs) with, the aid donors: in particular, it had accepted by the mid- 
1980s that priority that needed to be given to the restoration of foreign investment and 
liberalisation, whereas Zambia continued until almost the millennium to cling to the idea of 
state participation in strategic industries including mining19. Even more importantly, Ghana 
embraced with much more conviction than Zambia the pro-poor, redistributive rhetoric 
emanating from the international development agencies and embodied in the Multilateral, 
later Millennium, Development Goals and their associated apparatus of Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facilities (ESAFs), which eventually morphed into Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
because it was ahead of the game in being able to foresee the political and fiscal advantages 
which might flow from broader-based development.  
 A crucial milestone in cementing the Ghana government’s alliance with both cocoa 
producers and aid donors was the liberalisation of cocoa marketing in 1992. This reform 
removed the implicit export tax on cocoa, gave approximately half of it back to cocoa 
producers20 and channelled the remaining half into programmes of subsidy and technical 
development programmes designed to increase the productivity and competitiveness of the 
cocoa industry.  The impacts even of the half which was distributed to cocoa producers were 
very widely diffused, since cocoa is a labour-intensive crop grown by small as well as large 
farmers, and account for a substantial part of  Ghana’s achievement in halving poverty 
between 1990 and 2014, and substantially reducing inequality (by contrast, in Zambia, 
poverty scarcely changed over this twenty-five year period, and inequality has risen slightly)21. 
                                                          
17 Data illustrating the gap between the on-farm price and the export realisation from the 1950s through the 
1980s is provided by Bates (1981), appendix B. 
18 The ratio of commodity taxes to total tax revenue in Ghana is estimated at 30-35% in the 1980s, falling to 
between 15 and 20% by 2005-10; in Zambia, it is estimated at 25-30% in the 1980s, falling to just under 10% 
between 2005-10 (source: IMF, International Financial Statistics) 
19 In Ghana the ratio of aid to GNP was around 13% in the first half of the 1990s, rising to around 21% in the first 
half of the 2000s; in Zambia the ratio was around 10% in the first half of the 1990s, rising to 16% in the first half 
of the 2000s; in both countries, the aid-to-GNP ratio has fallen back into single figures since the beginning of the 
present decade under the impetus of economic growth. However, the key difference between the aid 
relationships of the two countries resides not in these numbers, but rather in the quality of the relationship (and 
in particular the poverty reduction commitment of the Ghana government), which made possible the exchange 
of ideas on tax reform (for example concerning ‘linked taxation’, user charges, and the taxation of the informal 
sector), on a scale which did not occur in Zambia. 
20 The proportion of the export price received by Ghanaian cocoa growers rose to 58% in 1992, fell to around 
half in the mid 1990s and rose again to 60% during the early 2000s. See Mosley(2012) figure 5.2. 
21 In Ghana, headcount poverty across the country as a whole fell from 51% to 24% between 1990 and 2014, 
according to successive reports of Ghana Living Standards Surveys, and the Gini coefficient of inequality has 
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They were also important fiscally, because, by cutting taxes on a large and politically 
outspoken section of the population, in combination with the aid-led structural shift of public 
expenditure into health, education, agricultural extension and rural infrastructure ( which 
raised the pro-poor expenditure ratio from around 5% to around 35% between 1990 and 2014 
; see table 7)  they provided the government of Ghana, as already mentioned, with an 
eloquent down payment towards the formation of an equitable fiscal contract. Both the shift 
towards pro-poor human capital expenditure and even the formal part of the fiscal contract, 
the earmarking of particular taxes to particular expenditure headings, were, for a period, 
emulated by the Zambia government also, but with less conviction, less effective publicity and 
less impact22. 
 However, the importance of smallholder exports (in Ghana, by the cocoa industry) 
goes beyond their fiscal role. Once liberalised, the Ghana cocoa industry was able to assert 
itself as a key player in political debate, and began to use its muscle to countervail the policies 
of ‘urban bias’ (i.e. cheap food and cheap inputs, in the interests of importers,  especially 
multinational companies) which had afflicted Ghana, Zambia and most other African 
countries since colonial times. In particular, the previous pattern of a state dominated by rent-
seekers, able to insist on cheap-input policies in return for the provision of support to the 
government, was replaced by a ‘strategic alliance’ in which both cocoa exporters and 
government jointly agreed, as the outcome of a bargaining process, that they have more to 
gain than to lose by the preservation of free-market policies in specific markets, including 
most particularly the preservation of a competitive real exchange rate23, in defiance of the 
wish of importers and rent-seekers for a higher exchange rate and lower input prices. As Table 
                                                          
fallen from 45% to 33%.  In Zambia, the national poverty headcount rate has been static at just over 60% from 
1990 to the early 2000s (Data published in April 2016 by the Central Statistical Office suggest that national 
headcount poverty in 2015 may have fallen to 54%, but these data are apparently contradicted by rural poverty 
data from the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Unit(IAPRI), see Mosley(2017 forthcoming), notes to table 4.4, 
page 118.) The Gini coefficient has risen slightly since 1990 from 61% to 64%, see Table 7 below. 
22 Zambia increased the share of its public expenditure devoted to health and education from 24% to 34% 
between 1990 and 2014, by comparison with Ghana’s increase of that percentage from 5% to 35% over the 
same period (see Table 7 below). Ghana, as described earlier, committed monies derived from increases in VAT 
in 2000 and 2003 to the Ghana Education Trust and the national health insurance scheme respectively; it also 
applied the same principle to a ‘talk tax’ on mobile phone calls, earmarked to expenditures for the reduction of 
youth unemployment. All of these measures can be seen as attempts to make the fiscal contract between 
taxpayers and government explicit. Zambia also attempted this kind of earmarking with respect to mineral 
taxation in 2008, when a windfall tax on copper was earmarked to be spent one-half on health and education in 
the poorer districts of Zambia, and one-half on local councils. This tax was however dropped in 2009, and in spite 
of governments that it was being reintroduced in 2011, there has been no sign of this being implemented. 
23 Our argument concerning the determination of policy in Ghana is inspired by Kang (2002), who explains the 
economic success of South Korea in the last quarter of the twentieth century, by contrast with the Philippines, 
in terms of a politics in which business and government were equally matched, rather than government being 
overwhelmed by the pressure of rent-seekers, leading to the preservation of openness in key markets, especially 
the market for foreign exchange. In Zambia, by contrast with Ghana, there has never existed any interest group 
with the political muscle to force government to keep the real interest rate competitive in defiance of the 
pressures of rent-seekers, although signs are emerging that Chinese firms in the manufacturing and construction 
industries are beginning to exercise pressures of this sort: see Hinfelaar and Achberger(2015:12-13) 
 
27 
 
7 shows, the Ghanaian real exchange rate has depreciated steadily since the reforms of the 
1990s, thereby boosting exports and their diversification24, the growth rate and, eventually, 
tax revenue. By contrast, as may be seen in the same table, the Zambian real exchange rate 
has gone in the opposite direction, and hence growth and tax revenue have been pro tanto 
lower. Fundamentally, this is because the Zambian government is not confronted by any 
interlocutor as powerful as the Ghanaian cocoa producers’ lobby to restrain it from policies 
of urban bias, and in particular from policies of pegging the exchange rate and other key 
prices. In the absence of such restraints, exchange controls have been reintroduced in Zambia 
(in 2013), accompanied by other policies in restraint of free trade, such as controls on the 
export of maize. An additional lesson which we learn from these case-studies is that political 
pressure to maintain urban bias, when surrendered to, generates upward pressures on the 
real exchange rate which damage competitiveness25; and if these pressures can be 
countervailed, as they have been in Ghana, that will impact on the growth and thus the tax-
earning potential of the economy. 
 Our story so far, then (see Table 7), is that the superior tax performance of Ghana in 
relation to Zambia is partly owing to causes already discussed, including the trend towards 
providing a better quality of public expenditure as a down-payment towards a durable fiscal 
contract, but also due to more fundamental factors not so far incorporated in the model, in 
particular the bargaining relationship between government and private interests (especially 
exporters) and its implications for the real exchange rate and competitiveness. However, 
there are two elements in this story which need closer attention.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Ghana and Zambia: comparative trends 1990-2014 
 Ghana Zambia 
                                                          
24 As shown in Table 7, the Ghana real exchange rate, setting 1990 at 100, has depreciated to 186, whereas the 
Zambian RER, using the same measure, has risen from 100 to 79.  
25 If equation (3) in table 5 (and figure 2b) is amended to incorporate the real exchange rate on the right-hand 
side, the estimated equation, within that five-equation model, becomes: 
 
GDP growth =-1.05  + 0.13**public expenditure/GDP ratio +0.47***public investment/GDP ratio  
                          (0.73)   (2.19)                                                          (7.38)                                                            
-0.029**primary school enrolment rate +0.0003**real effective exchange rate -0.00008GNIPK1980, obs=143, 
 (2.46)                                                               (2.01)                                                          (0.12) 
r2=0.23. Figures in parentheses beneath coefficients are Student’s t-statistics.(Note that the real exchange rate 
in this formulation is the number of dollars that can be exchanged for a unit of local currency, in other words 
an increase in this number implies a depreciation of the real exchange rate.) 
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Tax ratio, 1990-2014 11             21 21                 18 
Governance: 
Democratic accountability, 
1990 versus 2014: 
Polity score(p_democ) 
Narrative 
 
 
2                5 
Multi-party democracy 
since 1992 
 
 
2                 4.5 
Dominant party (Movement for Multi-
party Democracy) 1990-2005; multi-
party democracy since 2005 
Tax structure: 
Revenue authorities 
Ghana National 
Revenue Secretariat 
established 1983, 
converted into Revenue 
Agencies Governing 
Board 1998 
Zambia Revenue Authority established 
1991 
Tax exemptions None, but two larger 
mining corporations 
(Newmont and Anglo 
Gold ) pay lower rates 
of royalty 
 Multiple: Only two mining corporations 
(Kansanshi and Lumwana) pay corporate 
income tax 
Public expenditure:  
Pro-poor 
expenditure/effectiveness 
of public spending, 1990 
versus 2014: 
4.7               35.0 24.3        36.9(2008)          34.0(2014) 
Macro-economic 
environment: 
Real exchange 
rate(1990=100)* 
 
 
186 
 
 
79 
Gini coefficient of income 
inequality 
45                33 61                   64 
 
*Our measure of the real exchange rate denotes the amount of foreign currency that can be 
exchanged for a US dollar: therefore it increases as the real exchange rate depreciates. 
 
 The first of these is the implementation of tax policies and their visibility, in particular 
towards the corporate sector. We shall focus on mining tax policies. 
 In both Ghana and Zambia, governments have followed broadly similar policies of 
increases in the standard rates of corporation tax and royalty during the boom years (2003-
08), accompanied by flirtations with windfall taxes, ‘linked’ as earlier described to specific 
items of public expenditure.   These tax increases are integrally linked  with the consolidation 
of democratic governance: when the Ashanti-dominated National Patriotic Party, the 
successor to Busia’s National Democratic Council of the late 1960s, took over the government 
of Ghana in 2000 it immediately brought in a windfall profits tax on mining in order to shift 
the burden of taxation off the shoulders of rural businesses (and cocoa in particular) on to 
mining, and when the Zambian Movement for Multiparty Democracy(MMD) which previously 
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had enjoyed dominant party status, started to experience serious competition from the rival 
Patriotic Front (PF), it too used a windfall profits tax in order to counteract the PF’s 
increasingly powerful argument that the privileges of the multinational mining corporations 
needed to be restrained in favour of a fairer deal for the economically insecure (Cheeseman 
and Hinfelaar, 2009). 
What is crucial, however, is that whereas in Ghana all companies paid corporation tax 
(albeit with concessions for the largest producers, Newmont and Anglo Gold) in Zambia, only 
two mining companies, First Quantum(at Kansanshi) and Barrick Gold Mining (at Lumwana) 
ever paid income tax26 . This fact has become widely known and has begun to infect the 
political debate. Not only has it impaired the ability of the Zambian government to motivate 
compliance with the current fiscal contract, as in the Bolivian case previously discussed27; it 
has also caused NORAD (the Norwegian international development authority), the donor 
agency most concerned with the mining industry, having failed to persuade the Zambian 
ministry of finance after much pressure to enforce credible mineral taxation policies, to 
withdraw from Zambia in mid-201528. The consultants appointed to review Zambia’s mineral 
policies had previously reported that ‘the government revenue instruments for mining 
developed for Zambia…failed by a large margin to deliver what could be considered an 
effective ‘benefit sharing’ of revenues’ (Lundstöl 2014:1). In other words, observed tax 
compliance especially in relation to high-profile taxpayers, and not only advertised tax rates 
and bases, are crucial for determining trust, and thence trusters’ (i.e. taxpayers’), willingness 
to participate in fiscal contracts. 
             The second issue requiring further discussion is the role of regulatory bodies, i.e. 
autonomous revenue authorities such as the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and Revenue 
Authorities Governing Body (RAGB) in Ghana. Since the beginning of the structural 
adjustment process in the 1980s, it has been an axiom of reformers – and the IMF in particular 
– that the office responsible for revenue collection needs to be uncoupled from the national 
ministry of finance, and the apparatus of central government more generally, in order to 
prevent privileged taxpayers from making corrupt deals with central government staff which 
breach the tax code.  Autonomous revenue authorities have been the main focus for the 
reform efforts of aid agencies and IFIs, and independent revenue authorities have sprung up 
all over Africa and Latin America25. Ghana was very early in accepting this prompt from the 
international funding agencies: in 1983, in the early reform period before the advent of 
democracy, it established a semi-autonomous National Revenue Secretariat (NRS) , including 
a new Minister of National Revenue, to oversee the newly formed IRS (Internal Revenue 
Service) and CEPS (Customs, Excise and Preventive Services), ‘each of which were granted 
                                                          
26 Lundstöl et al. (2013), pp24-31 and especially graph 4.4 on page 24. 
27 See passage keyed by note 5, page 3 above. 
28 Zambia Weekly, 15 June 2015. 
25 For a discussion of the influence of autonomous revenue authorities in Africa see Ayee and Joshi(2009) and 
for Latin America see Bergman(2003). 
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greater autonomy from the main civil service, including salary flexibility’ (Prichard 2009: 19, 
drawing on Osei and Quartey 2005). In 1998, a Revenue Agencies Governing Board (RAGB) 
provided a mechanism for integrating the work of these authorities, which was eventually 
amalgamated into an over-arching Ghana Revenue Authority.  Zambia eventually followed 
suit, establishing the Zambia Revenue Authority in 1991. 
 It might be expected that these independent revenue authorities would have 
exercised a significant impact on tax collections, and in the case of Ghana such an 
independent impact has been asserted by Chand and Moene (1999), who insist that the 
increase in Ghana’s tax ratio from 4% to 17% between 1983 and 1994 was largely due to 
reforms in tax administration. However, there is no evidence of the Zambia Revenue 
Authority having had a similar impact, as by contrast with the Ghanaian case  the trend of tax 
ratios has been downward since the ZRA was established (as shown by figure 3b). Two more 
fundamental problems raised by Fjeldstad and Moore (2008) are that autonomous revenue 
authorities are in fact, not at all homogeneous, and that they may not function in the impartial 
manner visualised by donors because in some cases ‘ the label “autonomy” has disguised the 
fact that they have been answerable to only one person, the president’ (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008: 251). Taking together these two problems, they conclude that ‘there is little sign that 
the creation of revenue agencies has increased public revenues’ (Masiye, 2016: 10, drawing 
on Fjeldstad and Moore).  Cross-section regressions conducted by Mike Masiye on a more 
recent dataset than that used by Fjeldstad and Moore suggest, however, that their conclusion 
may be over-pessimistic, and that a significant impact of independent revenue authorities on 
tax ratios is observable across LDCs as a whole (Masiye, 2016: see both fixed-effects and 
random-effects regressions).  Thus, although there are strong a priori reasons for casting 
doubt on autonomous revenue authorities as a panacea for improving revenue performance, 
there is currently unresolved controversy concerning their true impact. 
 
5. Conclusions and next steps 
We have tried to find out what kind of institutions and policies can be expected to 
encourage the construction of a tax base capable of providing an impulse to development, 
even in the poorest countries, even in fragile states where any extension in taxation is 
politically risky. Starting from Rousseau’s idea  that increased democratic accountability, in 
the form of a fiscal ‘social contract’, will be good for effective tax collection and thence state-
building, we also argue, in common with a number of recent empirical findings, that a  ‘fiscal 
contract’ between taxpayers and  government (much of it consisting of implicit 
understandings but some of it consisting of explicit covenants linking specific tax payments 
and public expenditures)  will be most likely to emerge not only as a result of democratic 
participation and good bureaucratic practice within the tax system , but also if taxpayers trust 
the fiscal system as a whole, i.e. they feel that they are getting good value from government 
expenditures in exchange for their tax payments.  These ideas go beyond the macro-
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economic, structural and even governance issues featured in the majority of empirical 
estimates of tax yields, as summarised in Appendix 1. 
 We tested this basic hypothesis in two forms against a sample of 62 developing 
countries between 1980-2008: a single-equation model which examines the impact on tax 
ratio of democratic accountability and the value provided by public expenditure (measured 
in terms of the share of human capital expenditures in total government expenditure) and an 
instrumental-variables model which traces the causal influence of tax ratios on government 
expenditure, and thence on investment and growth. In both these formulations, the two 
governance variables mentioned emerge as significantly associated with the ability to build 
‘fiscal contracts’ and generate public revenue; and this can be seen as a causal relationship, 
because the associations continue to be significant when a lag is inserted into the link 
between the pro-poor expenditure ratio and the tax ratio, and into the link between the tax 
ratio and total government expenditure. 
Further insight was gained by examining in more detail two countries with opposite 
over-time tendencies in their tax ratios over the same thirty-year period: Ghana and Zambia 
(which, over that period, increased their democratic accountability score by almost the same 
amount). This comparison enabled us to observe some of the processes by which effective 
fiscal contracts were built: in particular the offer by government of a bona-fide, or incentive 
to take part in a contract – either a tax cut designed to buy bigger tax increases in future (as 
in Ghana in 1992), or evidence of effective public expenditure, or a formal or informal link 
between a particular tax base and a particular form of favoured public expenditure (as in the 
windfall taxes levied in the 1990s and 2000s in both countries). Our analysis has also revealed 
other possibilities for bona-fides which may consolidate social contracts, including the 
focussing of public expenditure on the poorest and/or politically most sensitive groups (which 
the significant coefficient on ipe in Tables 5 and 6 suggests would have a positive influence on 
tax yields) and establishing a level playing field for tax liability which publicly brings the large 
and powerful into the tax net. Comparative analysis of which of these bona-fides provides the 
most effective incentive for raising tax yields at the lowest cost constitutes an important 
horizon for future research. 
Our case-studies also suggested that in cases such as Ghana  where a ‘strategic 
alliance’ forms between government and a powerful exporting business, that will act as a 
liberalising influence on the real exchange rate (and thence, as our regressions show, on GDP 
growth rates and tax yields). Finally, it illustrated that if there is widely-disseminated evidence 
that big players (in particular multi-national corporations) are not paying what they owe, that 
will act as a disincentive to all the other players seeing their tax liability as contractual. Other 
issues, however, remain unresolved, in particular the ability of autonomous revenue 
authorities to reduce corruption and increase tax yields. 
There  is now abundant evidence that several low-income countries (not only Ghana 
as illustrated by our case-study, but also Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda; see Figure 1 above) have 
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been able to break out of the low income – weak government - fragile state – low tax capacity 
– low income trap, and that the formation of a fiscal contract, often with the assistance of the 
IMF and aid donors, is therefore possible in poor as well as middle-income countries. However 
it remains the case that low-income countries still, on average, have worse tax performance 
than lower-middle and middle- income countries, and this holds their entire development 
back. The particular aspect of this that we would like to raise in conclusion is that the 
formation of fiscal contracts is not a one-shot action, but a process, often long-drawn out in 
time and often requiring experimentation and policy reversal (the case of Ghana’s botched 
and excessive initial VAT increase in 1995 is relevant here). Moreover, it is a process requiring 
the slow building of trust, and this requires in turn the making of down payments or bona-
fides which require risk-taking and financial sacrifices exceeding the capacity of the poorest 
developing- country administrations, -especially if they are also fragile, conflict-vulnerable 
states. To take a specific example, the crucial move made by Ghana in 1992, of liberalising its 
cocoa industry, was important in presenting the Ghana government as a credible partner in a 
fiscal contract and politically enabling the raising of taxes elsewhere in the economy; but it 
was a move with considerable short-term financial costs (note the dip in Ghanaian public 
revenue after 1992 on figure 3a) and this implies costs, and political risks, not necessarily 
affordable by a state with a weaker bureaucracy and less access to aid donors: for example, 
an Afghanistan, a Burundi, a Southern Sudan, a Central African Republic or a DRC29. The 
question what kind of ‘down payments’ towards a fiscal contract can feasibly be made by 
governments in this predicament represents, in our opinion, an important frontier for future 
research. 
  
                                                          
29 The question of how to best target expenditure (and, by our argument, increase tax yield) in ‘fragile states’ is 
addressed by the recent OECD report on those states (OECD 2014). This draws particular attention (OECD 2014: 
45, box 5.1) to the One Cow per Poor Family programme in Rwanda, which being targeted, asset-based and 
decentralised, satisfies several of the conditions for a positive bona-fide towards the making of a fiscal contract. 
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Appendix 1. Regression-based studies of drivers of tax ratios 
Investigator Dependent 
variable, 
sample and 
time period 
Estimation 
method 
Independent (right-hand side) variables in regression(*denotes significance of this 
variable at the 5% level or higher) 
Remarks 
Macro-economic Economic 
structure 
and shares 
of specific 
sectors in 
total 
revenue 
Governance Other 
1.Williamson 
(1961) 
T/Y(33 LDCs 
1950-59) 
OLS Per capita GNP*     
2.Plasschaert 
(1962) 
T/Y(20 LDCs 
1950-59) 
OLS Per capita GNP, 
import/GNP ratio* 
    
3.Hinrichs(1966) T/Y(all 
available LDCs 
1950-65) 
OLS Per capita GNP, 
openness* (defined as 
share of imports) 
    
4.Lotz and 
Morss(1967) 
T/Y 
(72 developed 
countries and 
LDCs, 
1962-66) 
OLS Per capita 
GDP(private)*, 
openness* ([X+M]/Y) 
    
5.Shin(1969) T/Y(LDCs 
1962-66) 
OLS Per capita GDP, 
inflation* 
Shares of 
agriculture 
and mining 
in GDP 
 Population 
growth* 
 
6.Lotz and 
Morss(1970) 
T/Y(50 
developing 
countries, 
1962-66) 
OLS Per capita 
GDP(private)*, 
openness* ([X+M]/Y) 
 ‘Government 
centralisation’ (i.e. 
autocracy) 
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7.UNCTAD(1970) T/Y OLS Per capita GDP*, 
inflation rate* 
Share of 
agriculture in 
GDP* 
   
8.Chelliah(1971) T/Y 
(developing 
countries, 
1966-68) 
OLS Per capita GDP Shares of 
mining* and 
agriculture in 
GNP 
   
9.Bahl(1972) T/Y(developin
g countries, 
1966-68) 
Simulation 
study 
Shares of agriculture, 
mining and 
manufacturing in 
income; tax rates 
   Not a regression study; 
therefore no estimates of 
significance for particular 
determinants of tax yields 
10.Chelliah, Baas 
and Kelly 
(1975) 
T/Y, net of 
social security 
payments 
(47 LDCs 
1969-71) 
OLS Per capita GDP 
openness 
(exports/GDP*) 
Share of 
mining in 
GDP*, share 
of 
agriculture in 
GDP 
   
11.Tait, Grätz, 
and Eichengreen 
(1979) 
T/Y 
(63 LDCs 
1972-76) 
OLS Per capita GDP(net of 
exports), 
openness 
(exports/GDP) 
Shares of 
agriculture 
and mining* 
in GDP 
 
   
12.Tanzi(1987) T/Y(LDCs 
1975-85) 
OLS Per capita GDP Shares of 
mining* and 
agriculture* 
in income 
   
13.Leuthold 
(1991) 
T/Y 
(eight African 
countries 
1973-81) 
OLS, also 
autoregressive 
methods 
Desired tax share, , 
openness* ([X+M]/Y) 
 
 
Shares of 
mining and 
agriculture* 
in income 
  Optimising model: public 
decision maker 
maximises private 
disposable income and 
value of public goods and 
services 
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14.Ghura(1998) T/Y 
(38 sub-
saharan 
African 
countries 
1985-96) 
OLS and panel-
data (random 
and fixed 
effects) 
Per capita income*, 
trade 
openness*,inflation* 
structural reforms* 
Agriculture 
share of 
GDP*, share 
of minerals 
and mining* 
Corruption 
(Transparency 
International index)* 
Human capital 
development* 
 
15.Tanzi and 
Davoodi(2000) 
T/Y (cross-
section of 
countries 
1980-97) 
OLS Per capita income* Agriculture 
share*, trade 
share* 
Corruption*   
16.Adam, Bevan 
and Chambas 
(2001) 
T/Y (22 sub-
saharan 
countries 
1980-96) 
OLS, 
instrumental 
variables, 
GMM 
 
Per capita income*, 
inflation, real exchange 
rate* 
Agriculture, 
industry and 
trade shares 
   
17.Piancastelli 
(2001) 
T/Y (75 
countries 
1985-95) 
OLS and panel-
data (random 
and fixed 
effects) 
Per capita GDP  Trade share 
of GDP*, 
agriculture 
share*, 
manufacturi
ng share*, 
services 
share* 
   
18.Eltony(2002) T/Y (6 oil-
producing and 
10 non-oil 
producing 
Arab 
countries, 
1994-2000) 
OLS Per capita GDP* Trade share 
of GDP* 
   
19.Bird, 
Martinez-
T/Y and 
current 
revenue minus 
OLS and panel-
data (random 
Per capita GDP Agriculture/ 
GDP* 
‘Institutions’* Population 
growth*, size of 
shadow economy, 
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Vasquez and 
Torgler(2004) 
grants as 
share of 
GNP(110 
developing 
and 
transitional 
countries, 
1990-99) 
and fixed 
effects) 
Gini coefficient of 
inequality* 
 
20.Teera and 
Hudson(2004) 
 
T/Y(116 
developed and 
less developed 
countries, 
1975-98) 
 
OLS and panel-
data  
 
Per capita GDP, 
openness*[(X+M)/GDP], 
debt/GDP] 
 
Agriculture/ 
GDP* 
  
Overseas aid; 
population; 
size of ‘shadow 
economy’ 
(proxied by the 
amount of cash 
held by public as 
a share of GDP)* 
 
21.Baunsgaard 
and Keen(2005) 
T/Y (111 
developed and 
less developed 
countries, 
1975-2000) 
Panel data (RE 
and FE); 
instrumental 
variables; 
GMM 
Per capita GDP, 
openness*[(X+M)/GDP], 
Agriculture/
GDP; share 
of trade 
taxes and 
VAT in total 
revenue 
 Overseas aid*  
22.Gupta(2007) T/Y 
(1980-2004) 
Panel data 
with fixed- and 
random-
effects 
specifications, 
also 
difference-
GMM and 
system-GMM 
Per capita GDP* 
(significant in  low 
income countries only) 
 
 
Openness (goods and 
services/GDP) 
Agriculture/ 
GDP* 
 
Corruption*, political 
stability, rule of law 
Aid/GDP*  
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23.Keen (2012) T/Y excluding 
natural 
resource 
revenues (42 
African 
countries, data 
up to 2010  ) 
OLS Per capita GDP*, 
openness* 
Share of VAT 
in total 
revenue* 
 Anglophone 
country dummy* 
 
24.Drummond et 
al 
(2012) 
Total 
revenue/GDP 
(including 
social 
contributions 
and non-tax 
revenue) 
(72 countries, 
1980-2009) 
Panel data 
with fixed- and 
random-
effects 
specifications 
GDP/capita* 
Agriculture/GDP 
Inflation rate* 
Share of 
trade taxes 
Corruption, 
oil/natural resource 
rents*, size of 
shadow economy 
Aid/GDP  
25.Ebeke (2010) Total 
revenue/GDP; 
tax revenue 
instability(39 
countries, 
1980-2005) 
OLS and 
IV(both with 
fixed 
effects);GMM 
GDP/capita, debt/GDP, 
inflation 
Share of 
trade taxes 
and 
domestic 
taxes in total 
revenue 
 Overseas aid  
26.Ebeke and 
Ehrhart(2011) 
Total 
revenue/GDP; 
tax revenue 
instability(39 
countries, 
1980-2005) 
OLS and 
IV(both with 
fixed 
effects);GMM 
GDP/capita, debt/GDP, 
inflation 
Share of 
trade taxes 
and 
domestic 
taxes in total 
revenue 
 Overseas aid  
27.Le, Moreno-
Dodson and 
Bayraktar(2012) 
Total 
revenue/GDP 
(110 LDCs, 
1994-2009) 
Panel OLS with 
time and 
regional 
dummies 
GDP/capita; trade 
openness* 
Agriculture 
value 
added*; 
share of 
trade taxes 
Corruption 
index*;bureaucratic 
quality index 
Population*; size 
of shadow 
economy 
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and 
domestic 
taxes in total 
revenue 
28.Cyan, 
Martinez-
Vazquez and 
Vulovic(2013) 
Total 
revenue/GDP 
(94 countries 
1994-2008) 
OLS with fixed 
effects; 
stochastic 
frontier 
analysis 
GDP/capita*; trade 
openness/globalisation* 
Share of 
agriculture*, 
services*, 
construction
* 
Corruption index; 
political 
fractionalisation 
(measure of 
democratic 
accountability) 
Population 
density*; 
Education*; Gini 
coefficient of 
inequality 
Uses stochastic-frontier 
analysis to incorporate 
optimality considerations 
29.Fenocchietto 
and 
Pessino(2013) 
Tax effort 
(using 
stochastic 
frontier 
method) 
Panel data 
with fixed- and 
random-
effects 
specifications 
(check) 
Inflation, 
agriculture/GDP*,educa
tional level (secondary 
enrolment rate?), 
Openness (goods and 
services/GDP)* 
 
 Corruption index* Gini coefficient of 
inequality* 
Uses stochastic-frontier 
analysis to incorporate 
optimality considerations 
30.McNabb and 
LeMay-
Boucher(2014) 
Growth of 
GDP; 
determinants 
of T/Y are 
used as 
elements in an 
instrumenting 
equation 
OLS and fixed-
effects 
 Components 
of tax 
structure  
  Examines not only 
determinants of tax ratios 
but also their impact on 
growth; within this 
framework, finds impact 
of income taxes to be 
particularly harmful 
31.Langford and 
Ohlenburg(2016) 
T/Y 
(excluding 
natural 
resource 
revenue and 
social security 
contributions); 
Simultaneous 
estimation of 
parameters of 
stochastic 
frontier and 
inefficiency 
model within 
random-
GDP/capita, inflation* 
educational level 
(secondary enrolment 
rate?), educational 
level, 
openness 
(imports/GDP) 
Industrial 
structure 
(manufacturi
ng/output) 
Corruption index*, 
law and order*, 
democratic 
accountability 
 Uses stochastic-frontier 
analysis to incorporate 
optimality considerations 
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85 countries 
1983-2010) 
effects 
framework 
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Appendix 2. List of sampled countries 
Africa(24): Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana,   Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Latin America(16): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic 
Ecuador, Guatemala,   Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Venezuela. 
 
South and East Asia(13): Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam. 
 
Transitional & other(9): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey.   
 
